Promoting the Integrity of Foster Family Relationships: Needed Statutory Protections for Foster Parents by Nadile, Vincent S.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 62 | Issue 2 Article 4
1-1-1987
Promoting the Integrity of Foster Family
Relationships: Needed Statutory Protections for
Foster Parents
Vincent S. Nadile
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vincent S. Nadile, Promoting the Integrity of Foster Family Relationships: Needed Statutory Protections for Foster Parents, 62 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 221 (1987).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol62/iss2/4
Promoting the Integrity of Foster Family Relationships:
Needed Statutory Protections for Foster Parents
Unlike natural and adoptive parents, foster parents stand in an
unique position to the children under their care because that relationship
is designed to be a very temporary one.' The purpose of the foster care
system is to provide a child with a stable, non-institutionalized environ-
ment when that child's biological parents cannot properly minister to her
physical, emotional, and financial needs.2
Most children enter the foster care system through voluntary place-
ment by their natural parents.3 The natural families of foster children
usually consist of poor minority group members and single parents.4
Generally, physical or mental illness, marital difficulties, or financial
problems trouble the child's biological parents when they place the child
with the foster care agency. 5 In the typical foster care arrangement, the
foster care agency6 then places the child in the home of a couple that is
not related to her. These people become the child's foster parents.
Foster parents are state-licensed service providers. Under a board-
ing home agreement, 7 the state pays foster families a monthly stipend.8
Usually, these payments only cover the cost of the child's food, clothing,
medical and dental care, and other incidental expenses.9 Indeed,
couples generally do not realize any monetary profit as foster parents.
The reward that foster parents derive from their services is satisfaction-
satisfaction in knowing that they are nurturing a needy child in a healthy
and supportive familial environment.' 0
I CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR FOSTER FAMILY SERVICE 8 (1975). See
also A. GRUBER, CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: DESTITUTE, NEGLECTED .... BETRAYED 15 (1978) (func-
tion of the foster family is not to provide a permanent home for the foster child).
2 See Dobbs, Foster Care and Family Law: A Look at Smith v. Offer and the Constitutional Rights of
Foster Children and Their Families, 17J. FAM. L. 1, 2-3 (1979); Note, Constitutional Protection of Long-Term
Foster Families, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1191, 1191 (1979); Note, Foster Parents' Emerging Due Process Rights
in Pennsylvania, 83 DICK. L. REV. 123, 123 (1979).
3 Although some children enter the foster care system by court order, the majority of children
become enrolled in foster care programs through voluntary placement agreements executed by their
parents. Dobbs, supra note 2, at 1-2; Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interests?, 43 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 599, 600-01 (1973); Musewicz, The Failure of Foster Care: Federal Statutory Reform and the Child's
Right to Permanence, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 633, 639 (1981).
4 Dobbs, supra note 2, at 4 ("Pervasive poverty, minority group membership, and one-parent
families are characteristics frequently associated with natural families of foster children."). One
study discovered that a high number of children in foster care are from black or Puerto Rican homes
headed by single mothers with incomes falling below the poverty level. S. JENKINS & E. NORMAN,
FILIAL DEPRIVATION AND FOSTER CARE 2 (1972).
5 Dobbs, supra note 2, at 5.
6 "Foster care agencies are public or state-chartered private institutions operated under state
guidelines." Note, Constitutional Protection of Long-Term Foster Families, supra note 2, at 1192.
7 In the majority of states, foster parents must sign a boarding home agreement when the state
places a child in their home. Festinger, Placement Agreements with Boarding Homes: A Survey, 53 CHILD
WELFARE 643 (1974).
8 Dobbs, supra note 2, at 5.
9 L. CosTIN, CHILD WELFARE: POLICIES AND PRACTICE 341 (1972).
10 The people who become foster parents do so primarily because of their love of children and
their compassion for those in need. Sometimes, persons become foster parents because they wish to
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While the foster parents are ministering to the child's physical and
emotional needs, the task of the foster care agency is to help the biologi-
cal parents rectify the difficulties that precipitated the child's removal.
Once the natural parents can resume caring for their child, the agency
terminates the foster family relationship and returns the child to her nat-
ural home.'1 Thus, the primary goal of the foster care program is to
reunite the child with her rehabilitated natural parents.12
Although this system contemplates only short-term care, children
often spend unusually long periods of time with their foster parents.
Most of the approximately 500,000 children in the foster care system' 3
can expect to remain in that system for at least two and a half years.' 4
However, while foster care placements often last for several years, state
courts and legislatures have accorded few legal protections to foster
parents.
Courts have confronted two issues arising from long-term foster
care: (1) what is the tort liability of foster parents when their foster child
sues them for negligence? 15 and (2) what are the rights of foster parents
when the state foster care agency attempts to remove the foster child
from the foster home?16 These two issues present the most pressing
legal concerns of foster parents today.
This note argues that a careful analysis of these issues demonstrates
the need to provide certain statutory safeguards for foster parents. Part I
of this note examines the case law on the tort liability of foster parents
compensate for a prior disappointing relationship with their own children or parents. In other in-
stances, the foster parents may desire to relive the positive experiences they had in raising their own
children. See Madison & Shapiro, Permanent and Long-Term Foster Family Care as a Planned Service, 49
CHILD WELFARE 131, 133 (1970).
11 Dobbs, supra note 2, at 2-3.
12 Note, Foster Parents' Emerging Due Process Rights in Pennsylvania, supra note 2, at 123-24. See also
L. COSTIN, supra note 9, at 328; Mnookin, supra note 3, at 610-11.
13 This number may be a conservative estimate. One study maintains that at least this many
children are in foster care and that the actual figure may be as high as 750,000. J. KNrrXER & M.
ALLEN, CHILDREN WITHOUT HOMES 2 (1978).
14 R. HUBBELL, FOSTER CARE AND FAMILIES: CONFLICTING VALUES AND POLICIES 6 (1981) (citing
A. SHYNE & A. SCHROEDER, NATIONAL STUDY OF SOCIAL SERVICES TO CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES
(1978)). See also H.R. Rep. No. 136, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 46 (1979) (The Ways and Means Commit-
tee of the House of Representatives reported that about half of the children in foster care spend
more than two and a half years in the system.);J. KNrrZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 13, at 6, 24-26 (A
Children's Defense Fund study discovered that more than half of the children removed from their
homes had been in foster care programs for more than two years.). Some studies argue that the
average stay for children in foster care is at least five years. D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, CHILDREN IN
FOSTER CARE 476-77 (1978) (Over half of the children in foster care remain in foster care for more
than five years.); A. GRUBER, supra note 1, at 39-43 (The average time children spend in foster care is
more than five years.). See also Fanshel, Status Changes of Children in Foster Care: Final Results of the
Columbia University Longitudinal Study, 55 CHILD WELFARE 143, 145 (1976) (In New York City, 39
percent of the children in foster care were still in the system five years after they initially entered.).
15 See, e.g., Mayberry v. Pryor, 422 Mich. 579, 374 N.W.2d 683 (1985); Miller v. Pelzer, 159
Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924); Andrews v. County of Otsego, 112 Misc. 2d 37, 446 N.Y.S.2d 16
(1982); Miller v. Davis, 49 Misc. 2d 764, 268 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1966); Pickett v. Washington County, 31
Or. App. 1263, 572 P.2d 1070 (1977); Headrick v. Parker, No. 224 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 1986) (LEXIS,
State library, Tenn file); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
16 See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816
(1977); Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 600 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1979); Drummond v. Fulton
County Dep't of Family and Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
910 (1978).
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and proposes that state legislatures should provide liability insurance to
foster parents in order to safeguard the interests of both foster parents
and foster children. Part II discusses the statutory rights that foster par-
ents possess when the child welfare agency attempts to terminate the fos-
ter family relationship. This section suggests that the State of New
York's removal system, with certain modifications, should serve as a basic
paradigm. The note concludes that successful resolutions to the current
issues confronting foster parents must come from legislative bodies;' 7
courts cannot properly resolve the problems plaguing the present foster
care system.
I. The Tort Liability of Foster Parents
Few jurisdictions have considered whether foster parents can be
held liable for the torts of their foster children. Most of these jurisdic-
tions have analyzed the issue solely through their courts. Those courts
have analyzed foster parent liability in terms of whether the foster parent
stood in loco parentis to the child when the child committed the tort.
At common law, the in loco parentis doctrine applied to an individual
who had assumed all the rights, duties, and responsibilities of a parent. 18
In the context of liability for negligent conduct, courts must decide
whether a foster parent stands in loco parentis to her foster child in order
to determine whether the foster parent can assert parental immunity as a
defense.
The parental immunity doctrine, which first appeared in Anglo-
American law in the 1891 case of Hewlett v. George,19 holds that a parent is
immune from tort actions brought by an unemancipated minor child.20
In the last half century, the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity has
17 A number of writers have asserted that structuring protections and rights for the various par-
ticipants in the foster care system is within the province of the judiciary. Musewicz, supra note 3;
Note, The Due Process Rights of Foster Parents, 50 BROoKL.Y'N L. REV. 483 (1984); Note, Constitutional
Protection of Long-Term Foster Families, supra note 2; Note, Foster Parents' Emerging Due Process Rights in
Pennsylvania, supra note 2; Note, Children in the Foster Family: What Constitutional Rights and Procedural
Protections are Accorded?, 15 Hous. L. REV. 948 (1978); Note, Foster Parents Have No Liberty Interest in
Foster Children, 49 Miss. L.J. 518 (1978).
18 See, e.g., Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1947) ("The term 'in loco
parentis,' according to its generally accepted common-law meaning, refers to a person who has put
himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental rela-
tion without going through the formalities necessary to legal adoption [and] embodies the two ideas
of assuming the parental status and discharging the parental duties."); In re Adoption of Crystal
D.R., 331 Pa. Super. 501, 503, 480 A.2d 1146, 1148 (1984) (In order to assume the status of in loco
parentis, a person must assume "rights and liabilities ... exactly the same as between parent and
child.").
19 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) (sometimes cited as Hewellette v. George) (daughter brought an
action against mother for false imprisonment).
20 In creating this exception to general tort liability, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Hewlett
cited no authority for its holding. Instead, the court relied exclusively on what it considered neces-
sary public policy-the preservation of the family relationship. Tennessee adopted the rationale of
the Hewlett court and became the second state to create parental immunity in McKelvey v. McKelvey,
I ll Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (minor child brought an action against father and stepmother for
cruel and inhuman treatment). The third state to adopt parental immunity was Washington in Roller
v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (daughter brought an action against father for rape).
Hewlett, McKelvey, and Roller, all decided around the turn of the century, have become dubiously
known as the "great trilogy." See, e.g., Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Famil,-Husband
and Wife-Parent and Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 182 (1961) ("The Hewelette [sic], McKelve. and Roller
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been severely criticized 21 and even abolished in some jurisdictions. 22
Many states, however, still recognize the general rule or some variation
of it.23 In those jurisdictions that still uphold some form of the doctrine,
cases constitute the great trilogy upon which the American rule of parent-child tort immunity is
based.").
The parental immunity doctrine is based on the reluctance of courts to interfere with the familial
relationship. Historically, courts have advanced several policy reasons in support of parental immu-
nity: (I) the rule is necessary for the protection of domestic harmony; (2) the rule prevents fraud
and collusion among family members attempting to collect on liability insurance policies; (3) any
change in the rule would adversely interfere with parental care and discipline; and (4) depletion of
family resources in favor of the injured child would occur at the expense of the other children in the
household. See generally Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of aJustification, 50 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 489 (1982); Ingram & Barder, The Decline of the Doctrine of Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 68
ILL. B.J. 596 (1980).
21 State courts and legal scholars have advanced a number of arguments that question the
soundness of the parental immunity rule.
First, it is doubtful that the rule promotes familial tranquility. To preclude a child's suit for
injuries in the name of domestic tranquility is to assert "that an uncompensated tort makes for peace
in the family." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 122, at 866 (4th ed. 1971). Ifa child
must resort to court action to receive compensation for injuries inflicted by her parent, the domestic
peace was probably irreparably damaged long before commencement of the suit. Thus, allowing the
child to sue for redress of her injuries would not significantly further disrupt the familial relation-
ship. Indeed, the act or omission on which the child's suit is based should be viewed as the disquiet-
ing matter, and not the suit itself. See, e.g., Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907
(1975).
Second, while the possibility of fraud or collusion on the part of the family in order to collect
insurance proceeds exists, concern for the child's welfare is an important reason to allow suit. See,
e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967). In addition, "the possibility that some litigants in a
particular class may be guilty of fraud or collusion does not require the courts to deny relief to
everyone in the class, many of whom are admittedly deserving." Hollister, supra note 20, at 501.
Third, the contention that parental authority and discretion would be undermined without the
rule is a rather tenuous argument. This is demonstrated by the existence of a widely held exception
to the doctrine-the liability of parents to their children for intentional torts. Id. at 505. No evi-
dence suggests that the abrogation of the immunity for intentional torts has produced any loss of
parental authority. Id.
Finally, it is also unconvincing to argue that compensating an injured child would invariably
result in a depletion of family resources to the detriment of the child's innocent siblings. Courts
have often directed parents to pay an award to one child without exhibiting a similar concern for the
financial well-being of the child's siblings. For example, courts have traditionally permitted children
to sue their parents in the property and contract areas. See, e.g., Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan.
758, 611 P.2d 135 (1980); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); King v. Sells, 193
Wash. 294, 75 P.2d 130 (1938).
22 Sixteen states do not recognize the parental immunity doctrine: Alaska (Hebel v. Hebel, 435
P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967)); California (Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288
(1971)); Hawaii (Petersen v. City of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1970)); Kansas
(Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 611 P.2d 135 (1980)); Minnesota (Anderson v. Stream,
295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980)); Nevada (Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974));
New Hampshire (Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966)); New Mexico (Guess v. Gulf
Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 27, 627 P.2d 869 (1981)); North Dakota (Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D.
1967)); Ohio (Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 474 N.E.2d 275 (1984)); Oregon (Winn v.
Gilroy, 61 Or. App. 243, 656 P.2d 386 (1982)); Pennsylvania (Miller v. Leljedal, 71 Pa. Commw. 372,
455 A.2d 256 (1983)); South Carolina (Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980)); South
Dakota (courts have not addressed the doctrine); Utah (Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah
1980)); and Vermont (Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 370 A.2d 191 (1977)).
23 Twelve jurisdictions maintain an absolute ban on negligence suits: Alabama (Owens v. Auto
Mort. Indem., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937)); Colorado (Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 526 P.2d
304 (1974)); District of Columbia (Dennis v. Walder, 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968)); Georgia
(Coleman v. Coleman, 157 Ga. App. 533, 278 S.E.2d 114 (1981)); Indiana (Vaughan v. Vaughan,
161 Ind. App. 497, 316 N.E.2d 455 (1974); but see Buffalo v. Buffalo, 441 N.E.2d 711 (Ind. App.
1982) (non-custodial parent does not enjoy immunity)); Maryland (Shell Oil Co. v. Ryckman, 43 Md.
App. 1, 403 A.2d 379 (1979); see also Kirtz v. Kirtz, 52 Md. App. 136, 447 A.2d 492 (1982) (parent
could not sue child)); Mississippi (McNeal v. Administration of Estate of McNeal, 254 So.2d 521
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according in loco parentis status to a foster parent entitles the foster parent
to invoke the parental immunity shield when sued by her foster child.
A. Jurisdictions Granting In Loco Parentis Status to Foster Parents
Minnesota was the first state to consider the issue of foster parent
tort liability and grant in loco parentis status to foster parents. In Miller v.
Pelzer,24 the foster daughter entered the foster parents' home shortly af-
ter her birth. She remained in the home for twenty-five years until she
married. Upon leaming that she was a foster child, she filed suit against
her foster parents for fraud and deceit.2 5
The Supreme Court of Minnesota dismissed the foster child's com-
plaint.2 6 The court decided that the family relation that existed was "for
all practical purposes... just as sacred as if plaintiff had been the natural
daughter."2 7 In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that the
foster child had lived in the foster parents' home for an unusually long
period of time; indeed, the foster daughter had remained with her foster
parents for some seven years after attaining her majority. Thus, the Min-
nesota high court allowed the foster parents to invoke the shield of pa-
(Miss. 1971)); Montana (State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Leary, 168 Mont. 482, 544 P.2d 444 (1975));
Nebraska (Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 99 N.W.2d 16 (1959)); Rhode Island (Matarese v. Mata-
rese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925)); Tennessee (Mathis v. Ammons, 453 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D. Tenn.
1978)); and Wyoming (Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1971)).
The pioneer of the trend to carve out exceptions to the parental immunity rule was Wisconsin in
Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). In Goller, a foster son sued his foster father
for injuries he sustained while riding on a farm tractor that the foster parent owned and operated.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court abrogated parental immunity in negligence cases except in two situa-
tions: (1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over
the child, and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental discre-
tion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other
care. Several states have adopted this general approach: Arizona (Sandoval v. Sandoval, 128 Ariz
11, 623 P.2d 800 (1981)); Iowa (Wagner v. Smith, 340 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1983)); Kentucky (Rigdon
v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970)); Michigan (Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169
(1972)); NewJersey (Small v. Rockfeld, 66 NJ. 231, 330 A.2d 335 (1974)); and Texas (Felderhoffv.
Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971)).
Several other states have allowed a child to recover damages from her parent for injuries sus-
tained in automobile accidents: Arkansas (Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 276 Ark. 230, 633 S.W.2d
366 (1982)); Connecticut (Ooms v. Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 316 A.2d 783 (1972)); Delaware (Williams
v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976)); Florida (Arch v. Arch, 414 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 1982)); Illinois
(Moon v. Thompson, 127 Ill. App. 3d 657, 469 N.W.2d 365 (1984)); Maine (Black v. Solmitz, 409
A.2d 631 (Me. 1979)); Massachusetts (Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907
(1957)); North Carolina (Triplett v. Triplett, 34 N.C. App. 212, 237 S.E.2d 546 (1977)); Oklahoma
(Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984)); Virginia (Smith v. Kaufman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d
190 (1971)); Washington (Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411, 610 P.2d 891 (1980)); and West
Virginia (Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W.Va. 1976)).
The remaining jurisdictions recognize various other exceptions to the parental immunity doc-
trine: Idaho (Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 610 P.2d 560 (1980) (immunity only established for
parents' failure to supervise)); Louisiana (Bondurant v. Bondurant, 386 So.2d 705 (La. Ct. App.
1980) (no immunity for a noncustodial parent)); Missouri (Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663 (Mo.
1979) (no immunity for a noncustodial parent)); and New York (Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d
434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969) (parent-child immunity abrogated); but see Holodook
v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 38, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974) (parents not liable for failure to
supervise their children)).
24 159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924).
25 Id. at 376, 199 N.W. at 97.
26 Id. at 379, 199 N.W. at 98.
27 Id. at 377, 199 N.W. at 97.
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rental immunity, which Minnesota law then recognized, 28 because they
stood in loco parentis to their foster child.
The only other jurisdiction that has granted in loco parentis status to
foster parents is Wisconsin. In Goller v. White, 29 the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin affirmed the trial court's conclusion that a foster father stood
in loco parentis to his foster child. 30 Curiously, the court did not discuss
those factors which led it to conclude that the foster parent was entitled
to in loco parentis status, thereby allowing him to invoke the parental im-
munity rule. The court, however, then abolished the immunity rule ex-
cept in cases involving the exercise of parental control and authority or
the exercise of parental discretion with regard to food and care.31
The Goller court did not consider any of the factors that distinguish a
foster family from a traditional family.32 The court could have noted that
while a natural family is biologically created, the foster family has its ori-
gins in state statutes.33 One other important distinction is that, unlike a
biological family, a foster family is not intended to be a permanent living
construct. 34 Finally, the court should have observed that foster parents
do not assume all the rights and obligations of natural parents; indeed,
while foster parents are responsible for the everyday care of the child,
legal custody remains with the child welfare agency that initially placed
the child in the foster home.35 If the Goller court had carefully considered
these factors, it might have decided to deny in loco parentis status to foster
parents.
Moreover, in deciding Goller, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin did
not consider any of the public policy reasons for according special pro-
tections to foster parents. The court should have considered the unique-
ness of and necessity for the child welfare services that foster parents
provide. 36 Although the task of fashioning protections for foster parents
28 At the time this case was decided, Minnesota recognized the parental immunity doctrine. See
Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908). Minnesota has since abrogated parental
immunity. Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980). Though the judicially created
parental immunity doctrine has been abolished in Minnesota, foster parents in that state receive
statutory protections. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
29 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
30 Id. at 409, 122 N.W.2d at 196.
31 See supra note 23. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Goller did not elaborate on how its
holding should be applied. Wisconsin courts, however, have subsequently interpreted the "parental
control and authority" exception to encompass those actions that are undertaken for the purpose of
disciplining a child. See Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972); Thoreson v.
Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972). This approach ac-
cords with the traditional view that parents are permitted to use reasonable force to discipline their
children. See, e.g., Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903); Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366,
206 N.W. 173 (1925). Also, Wisconsin courts have interpreted the "parental discretion" exception
to include the parents' right to raise and educate their children in accordance with their own beliefs
and values. See, e.g., Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968).
32 See supra text accompanying notes 1-12.
33 Virtually every state has implemented foster care statutes. See Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child
Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1975).
34 See Goldstein, Why Foster Care-For Whom for How Long?, 30 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUD. OF THE
CHILD 647, 657 (1975).
35 See Dobbs, supra note 2, at 5.
36 The Goller court merely concluded that because the gravamen of the foster child's complaint
alleged negligent parental supervision (a cause of action not precluded by either judicially created
exception), the foster parent could be held liable. Goller, 20 Wis. 2d at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
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is more properly delegated to the legislative domain, the court in its
opinion could have alerted the legislature to the need for statutory safe-
guards for foster parents. However, nowhere in its opinion did the Goller
court state that the Wisconsin state legislature should insulate foster par-
ents from any negligence claims brought by, or on behalf of, the foster
children entrusted to their care.
B. Jurisdictions Denying In Loco Parentis Status to Foster Parents
Courts in New York and Michigan have held that foster parents do
not stand in loco parentis to the children under their care and, thus, are not
entitled to claim parental immunity as a defense in a foster child's negli-
gence suit against them. New York confronted the issue in Andrews v.
County of Otsego.37 In Andrews, a foster child sustained an eye injury while
in the care of his foster parents. The child's natural mother brought an
action on behalf of the child against the foster parents alleging negligent
supervision.3 8 The foster parents countered that, because under New
York law a child could not sue a natural parent for negligent supervi-
sion,39 they, as foster parents, should be granted the same immunity.40
The Supreme Court of New York in Andrews held that a foster child
could sue a foster parent for negligent supervision.41 The court gave
four rationales for its decision. First, the court emphasized the distinc-
tions between the foster family and the natural family. The court ob-
served that foster parents are only paid contract service providers.
Indeed, foster parent status can only arise out of a contract with the
state.42 The court reasoned that, in sharp contrast to natural parents,
this contractual relationship wholly dictates the duties that foster parents
owe to their foster children; such duties do not derive from any emo-
tional attachments. 43
Second, the court noted that the foster family relationship is
designed to be temporary. Foster parents, therefore, do not assume all
the legal obligations of natural parents. Although foster parents provide
for the child's daily care, the welfare agency retains legal custody. Ac-
cordingly, the agency-and not the foster parent-stands in loco parentis
to the child.44
37 112 Misc. 2d 37, 446 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1982).
38 Id. at 38, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
39 Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974) (infant child
does not have a direct cause of action against a natural parent for negligent failure to supervise).
40 Andrews, 112 Misc. 2d at 39, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
41 Id. at 41, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
42 Id.
43 See id. ("Although a foster parent may develop significant emotional ties with a foster child,
the duties owed to the child are ground in a 'knowingly assumed contractual relation with the
State.' ") (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
845 (1977)).
44 Id. at 42-43, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 173. Accord Miller v. Davis, 49 Misc. 2d 764, 268 N.Y.S.2d 490
(1966) (To establish that one stands in loco parentis, one must not only provide instruction and care
for the general welfare of the child, but one must also assume responsibility for the support of the
child.). Cf In re Adoption of Crystal D.R., 331 Pa. Super. 501,480 A.2d 1146 (1984) (Foster parents
had no standing to file a petition for termination of parental rights because they did not stand in loco
parentis to child entrusted to their care.).
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Third, the court commented that the objective of the foster family is
to facilitate the return of a child to the child's biological parents. 45 In-
deed, "the natural parent retains a paramount right to raise the child." 46
Finally, the court stated that improper supervision constitutes a basis
for termination of the foster family relationship. 47 Thus, it would be in-
consistent to suspend a foster parent's license for negligent supervision,
and yet to deny a foster child a cause of action for injuries sustained as a
result of that negligence.48
The Michigan Supreme Court adopted all of these rationales in de-
ciding Mayberry v. Pyor.49 The issue of foster parent liability in Mayberry
arose in a suit filed on behalf of Justin Mayberry, a deaf boy who was
seriously injured by a German shepherd. Neighbors of the boy's foster
parents owned the dog.50 The boy's natural mother, as conservator of
the boy's estate, commenced an action against his foster parents for neg-
ligent supervision. 51
The Michigan court ruled that, unlike natural parents, foster parents
may not raise the parental immunity shield 52 when their foster children
sue them for negligent supervision.5 3 The court found that the policy
rationales underlying the parental immunity doctrine-promotion of do-
mestic harmony, conservation of family resources, and judicial noninter-
vention in parenting decisions-did not justify extending the defense to
foster parents. 54
Drawing heavily on the New York Supreme Court's analysis in An-
drews,55 the Maybeny court outlined several reasons for denying in loco
parentis status to foster parents. These reasons included the foster par-
ents' lack of familial ties to the child, their temporary status as the child's
guardians, their compensation for parenting expenses, and their contrac-
tual relationship with the state's child welfare agency. 56 The court em-
phasized that the function of foster care is not to construct a "new
'family' unit" or to promote permanent emotional bonds between foster
parents and children.57 In the court's opinion, these factors militated
45 Andrews, 112 Misc. 2d at 43, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 44, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 174.
48 Id.
49 422 Mich. 579, 374 N.W.2d 683 (1985).
50 Id. at 582, 374 N.W.2d at 684.
51 Id.
52 In Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972), the Michigan Supreme Court em-
braced the approach of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122
N.W.2d 193 (1963). Accordingly, the Michigan court retained parental immunity for only two situa-
tions: Where the negligence involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child, or
an exercise of reasonable parental discretion regarding food, housing, clothing, health services, or
other care. See supra note 31. Under Michigan law, negligent supervision falls within the first
exception.
53 MVlaybeny, 422 Mich. at 592-93, 374 N.W.2d at 688-89.
54 Id.
55 Indeed, the Maybeny court quoted the Andrews decision at great length. Id. at 589-91, 374
N.W.2d at 687-88.
56 Id.
57 Id.
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against according foster parents the special protections that in loco parentis
status provides.
C. Balancing the Interests of Foster Parents and Foster Children:
The Statutory Approach
A disturbing aspect of both the Andrews and the Maybeny opinions is
that the courts in both cases failed to consider the possible detrimental
effects of imposing liability on foster parents. Failing to protect foster
parents from negligence suits brought by their foster children may dis-
courage many individuals from becoming foster parents.5 8 This fear of
liability may be a pressing concern for many foster parents because most
of them are from modest socioeconomic classes.5 9 Thus, failing to pro-
vide a liability safeguard for foster parents could have a devastating effect
on a child welfare agency's ability to secure an adequate number of
homes for children requiring foster care. Considering that the number
of foster children has increased dramatically in recent years, 60 this poten-
tial problem may become especially significant.
On the other hand, granting in loco parentis status to foster parents so
that they may claim parental immunity would be inappropriate for all the
reasons that the Andrews and Mayberry courts cited.6 ' In addition,
although foster care placements may last for several years, 62 the foster
family relationship does not confer the same rights and liabilities as does
the relationship between natural parent and child.63 Rather, the foster
family relationship is designed to be a subordinate one, supervised by a
child welfare agency. To grant in loco parentis status to foster parents
would give them effectively the same legal status as the child's natural
parents. Such action would make foster parents rivals, and not support-
ers, of the child's natural parents, a result that is antithetical to the ex-
press purposes of the foster care system. Moreover, as the Maybeny court
commented, the recent judicial trend is toward limiting the applicability
of the parental immunity doctrine.64' This trend favors denying foster
parents in loco parentis status so that they cannot invoke the seemingly
anachronistic defense of parental immunity.65
58 See Kern v. Steele County, 322 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Minn. 1982) (Wahl, J., dissenting) ("If foster
parents are excluded from a county's liability policy, individuals may be reluctant to volunteer their
services."). Cf Headrick v. Parker, No. 224 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 1986) (LEXIS, State library, Tenn file)
(The court rejected defendants' argument that any decision that fails to protect them from liability
would discourage others from serving as foster parents.).
59 See L. COSTIN, supra note 9, at 345 (Foster parents tend to have minimal educations and to be
from lower socioeconomic groups.); Dobbs, supra note 2, at 5 ("Most foster parents have middle or
lower-middle incomes."); Note, Foster Parents'EEmerging Due Process Rights in Pennsylvania, supra note 2,
at 123 (Foster parents tend to be from "lower-middle class" backgrounds.).
60 See M.JONES, A SECOND CHANCE FOR FAMILIES: FIvE YEARs LATER 5 (1985) ("National surveys
in 1961 and 1977 indicated a threefold increase in children in [foster] care during that 16-year
period.").
61 See supra text accompanying notes 41-57.
62 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Neither the Andrews nor the Mayberry court dis-
cussed this point.
63 See Miller v. Davis, 49 Misc. 2d 764, 268 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1966); In re Adoption of Crystal D.R.,
331 Pa. Super. 501, 480 A.2d 1146 (1984).
64 Maybeny, 422 Mich. at 593, 374 N.W.2d at 689.
65 Many critics have argued that the parental immunity doctrine is an anachronistic defense that
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The problem remains, though, of providing some type of liability
protection for foster parents while also safeguarding the interests of the
children entrusted to their care. Oregon has deemed foster parents to be
state employees who enjoy immunity from liability for any acts concern-
ing the supervision and care of their foster children.66 This is an unsatis-
factory approach. Although it protects the foster parents from tort
liability, it leaves the child uncompensated for her injuries. In essence,
this approach merely substitutes state immunity for parental immunity
and leaves the problem unsolved.
A more equitable solution to this problem is state-funded liability
insurance for foster parents. State legislatures could readily effectuate
this proposal. Indeed, because such a resolution requires the implemen-
tation of a state-wide insurance program, it could only be attained
through the legislative process. Maryland,67 Minnesota, 68 New Hamp-
shire,69 and Wisconsin 70 have already embraced this approach. Essen-
tially, these states require the commissioner of human services to supply
insurance coverage for any injuries that foster children sustain while in
their foster parents' household. 71 This approach, then, simultaneously
shields foster parents from economically damaging lawsuits while also
providing compensation for the injured child.
However, some aspects of the existing statutory schemes are troub-
ling. A problem with the Minnesota, New Hampshire and Wisconsin
statutes is that they do not differentiate between intentionally and negli-
deprives a child of compensation for negligently inflicted injuries. See supra notes 21-23 and accom-
panying text. Progressive commentators favor an approach employing the reasonable parent stan-
dard. This standard requires parents to act as ordinarily reasonable and prudent parents would act
in similar circumstances. See Hollister, supra note 20, at 527; Ingram & Barder, supra note 20, at 601.
Currently, only two jurisdictions have embraced this approach: California (Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.
3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971)) and Minnesota (Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d
595 (Minn. 1980)).
66 See Pickett v. Washington County, 31 Or. App. 1263, 572 P.2d 1070 (1977) (shelter care par-
ents, as county's agents, are generally immune from liability for acts and omissions relating to the
supervision, care, and custody of foster children).
67 MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 6-131 (1982) authorizes the state to provide insurance cover-
age for foster parents who care for children under foster parent programs. "[Tihe liability insurance
shall provide coverage for... [a]ctions against a foster parent by a natural parent for any accident to
the foster child." Id.
68 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 245.814 (West Supp. 1986) provides in relevant part:
The commissioner of human services shall within the appropriation provided purchase
and provide insurance to foster parents to cover their liability for: (1) injuries or property
damage caused or sustained by foster children in their home; and (2) actions arising out of
alienation of affections sustained by the natural parents of a foster child.
69 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161:4 (Supp. 1985) provides in relevant part:
The director of the division of human services, department of health and human serv-
ices, ... is hereby authorized ... to enter into a contract with an insurance company to
purchase personal liability coverage for individuals providing foster care for children ....
70 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 619.01(9) (West Supp. 1986) calls for foster home protection insurance to
safeguard "persons who receive a license to operate a foster home... against the unique risks ... to
which such persons are exposed." Presumably, this includes coverage for injuries that foster chil-
dren sustain while under the care of their foster parents.
71 California has also recognized the need to provide foster families with some type of liability
insurance. However, that state's insurance plan only extends coverage to third parties who are in-
jured through the misconduct of foster children. Thus, California's scheme does not insulate foster
parents from negligence claims brought by their foster children. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 23004.4 (West
Supp. 1986).
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gently inflicted injuries. Only Maryland attempts to distinguish the two
types of harms.72 State-funded liability insurance should not cover inju-
ries that foster parents have intentionally inflicted on their foster chil-
dren. Foster parents should absorb the costs of their deliberately
inflicted harms.73 To hold otherwise would effectively give foster parents
a license to act callously toward the welfare of their foster children.
When injuries arise from negligent conduct, however, the state should
supply ample liability coverage. 74 In order to meet the needs of both
foster parents and the children under their care most effectively, states
should enact legislation that provides foster parents with liability
insurance.
II. Safeguarding Foster Parents From Capricious State
Disruptions of Their Foster Homes
Foster parents also need procedural protections when the child wel-
fare agency attempts to disrupt their foster family relationship. Recently,
in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER),7 5
a group of New York City foster parents claimed that they had a liberty
interest 76 in their foster families which merited constitutional protection.
72 See supra note 67.
73 Even with respect to natural parents, many jurisdictions have refused to grant immunity when
the parents' tortious conduct was intentional. See, e.g., Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C.
1968); Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 526 P.2d 304 (1974); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70
S.E.2d 152 (1952); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Treschman v.
Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Rodebaugh v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 4 Mich.
App. 559, 145 N.W.2d 401 (1966); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958), rev'd on
other grounds, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1959); Hoffman v. Tracy, 67 Wash. 2d 31, 406 P.2d 323 (1965).
74 Most recent cases concerning foster parent tort liability have dealt with negligence suits. See,
e.g., Mayberry v. Pryor, 422 Mich. 579, 374 N.W.2d 683 (1985) (suit against foster parents for negli-
gent supervision in allowing a neighborhood dog to attack foster child); Kern v. Steele County, 322
N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1982) (suit against foster parents for negligent care in allowing foster child to
consume varnish remover); NewJersey Property-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. State, 195 N.J. Super. 4,
477 A.2d 826 (1984) (suit against foster parents for injuries that foster child sustained in accident);
Andrews v. County of Otsego, 112 Misc. 2d 37, 446 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1982) (suit against foster parents
for eye injury that foster child sustained because of negligent supervision); Pickett v. Washington
County, 31 Or. App. 1263, 572 P.2d 1070 (1977) (suit against shelter care parents for injuries that
foster child sustained while horseback riding after being allowed to leave shelter care parents' home
unattended); Headrick v. Parker, No. 224 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 1986) (LEXIS, State library, Tenn file)
(suit against foster parents for injuries that foster child sustained in a fall which occurred as a result
of negligent care).
The few courts that have addressed the issue of intentional tort suits against foster parents have
allowed foster children to sue their foster parents. Hanson v. Rowe, 18 Ariz. App. 131,500 P.2d 916
(1972); Vonner v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 273 So.2d 252 (La. 1973); Blanca v. Nassau County,
103 A.D.2d 524, 480 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1984). In such instances, courts have analogized the claims to
cases where natural parents engaged in intentional misconduct against their children and were de-
nied the parental immunity shield. Indeed, actions alleging intentional torts were one of the first
exceptions carved out of the parental immunity doctrine. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 122,
at 866-67; Hollister, supra note 20, at 498; Note, The Child's Right to "Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
Happiness '. Suits by Children Against Parents for Abuse, Neglect and Abandonment, 34 RTrrGERs L. REV. 154,
164-65 (1981).
75 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
76 A liberty interest may be defined as the constitutionally protected right of an individual to
enjoy those privileges that are essential to the proper functioning of a liberal democratic society. See
Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 552 n.2, 356 N.E.2d 277, 285 n.2, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 829 n.2
(1976). Examples of constitutionally acknowledged rights are the right to marry (e.g. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)), the right to establish a home and raise children (e.g. Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)), and the right to worship according to the dictates of one's conscience
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The plaintiffs alleged that the New York procedures for removing foster
children from foster homes 77 inadequately protected the foster family's
liberty interest.78 The Supreme Court of the United States avoided the
question of whether a foster family has a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest in its integrity by stating that if such an interest did exist, the
New York procedures adequately protected it.79
Since the OFFER decision, several lower courts have attempted to
determine whether a liberty interest is inherent in the foster family rela-
tionship. The results have been disparate. For example, in both Kyees v.
County Department of Public Welfare80 and Drummond v. Fulton County Depart-
ment of Family and Children's Services,81 the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Seventh and Fifth Circuits held that foster parents did not have a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in their relationship with their
foster children. Accordingly, the state was free to terminate the foster
family relationship at any time and for any reason.8 2 However, in Brown
v. County of SanJoaquin,8 3 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California rejected the holdings in Kyees and Drummond. The
(e.g. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). See also Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215 (1976); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Some disagreement exists among the Supreme CourtJustices concerning the sphere of constitu-
tionally protected liberty interests. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976),Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, stated that liberty interests are those interests that state law protects or that a spe-
cific provision in the Bill of Rights guarantees. Id. at 710. Justice Brennan, however, commented in
a dissent that "liberty" has always been a broad concept, not necessarily confined to those interests
enumerated in the Bill of Rights or acknowledged by the government. Id. at 722-23 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), Justice Powell, who delivered the
plurality opinion, essentially adopted the view ofJustice Brennan in Paul. Justice Powell remarked
that liberty should be defined as a "rational continuum" of freedoms. Id. at 501-02 (quoting Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
77 The New York State removal procedures are discussed in N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 400 (McKin-
ney 1983), and N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 431.10(a) (1983). These procedures become
operative when the child welfare agency decides to remove the foster child from her current foster
home, either to return her to her natural parents or to transfer her to another foster home. The
agency may remove the child at any time "in its discretion" (N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 383 (2) (McKin-
ney 1983)). A written notice must be given to the foster parents at least ten days prior to the re-
moval. If the foster parents desire, they may obtain a "conference" with the official of the agency
who authorized the removal. This "conference" is to be held within ten days of the foster parents'
request. At this meeting, the agency official tells the foster parents the reasons for the removal and
the foster parents may state reasons against it. Although the foster parents may appear with counsel
at the conference, it is not a full adversary hearing-the foster parents cannot call or cross-examine
witnesses nor may they inspect agency files. During this time, the foster family is entitled to a stay of
the removal until the agency renders a written decision. Three days after an adverse decision, how-
ever, the agency may remove the child from her foster parents. In such an instance, the foster par-
ents can appeal for a full adversary hearing with the department of family services; that hearing is
subject to judicial review. See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 400 (McKinney 1983).
Additionally, in New York City, foster parents are entitled to an adversary hearing before the
foster care agency removes the child and transfers her to another foster home under Special Services
for Children, Procedure No. 5 (August 5, 1974). This procedure does not apply if the child is re-
turning to her natural parents.
78 The plaintiffs in OFFER contended that the New York procedures violated the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. OFFER, 431 U.S. at 820.
79 Id. at 847.
80 600 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1979).
81 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
82 In both Kyees and Drummond, the foster parents had cared for the foster children for approxi-
mately two years before the state welfare agencies arbitrarily decided to end the relationships. kyees,
600 F.2d at 699; Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1203-04.
83 601 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
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district court asserted that foster parents possess a liberty interest in the
preservation of their foster families.8 4 The District Court of Appeal of
Florida reached an interesting result in Berhow v. Crow.85 In Berhow, the
court held that a couple had a fundamental liberty interest in sustaining
their relationship with one foster child, but did not have a similar consti-
tutional interest in maintaining their relationship with another foster
child.8 6 These decisions demonstrate that courts are ambivalent toward
according foster parents a liberty interest in preserving their familial re-
lationships with their foster children.
Meanwhile, numerous commentators have argued for definitive judi-
cial solutions to the liberty interest issue.8 7 Despite the recent focus on
judicial solutions to this issue, the judiciary is unsuited to fashioning ade-
quate protections on which foster parents may rely when the child wel-
fare agency seeks to discontinue the foster family relationship.
A. Problems Inherent in the Judicial Approach
A major problem with judicial recognition of a foster family liberty
interest is that such a finding would engender a conflict of interest be-
tween the foster family and the natural family. If the courts were to ac-
knowledge a constitutional liberty interest in foster family integrity,
foster parents would be encouraged to consider the relationship with
their foster child a permanent one. Such a result would frustrate the fun-
damental task of foster parents: to provide temporary care for a child
while her biological family is being rehabilitated.88 Indeed, the purpose
of foster care is to expedite the child's reunion with her natural parents
by providing a healthy familial way station. Recognition of a liberty in-
terest in the foster family relationship would contradict the avowed pur-
pose of the foster care system.
Even the Supreme Court of the United States in OFFER conceded
that tension exists between a foster family liberty interest and the pro-
fessed goals of foster care. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan ob-
served that:
[T]he natural parent of a foster child in voluntary placement has an
absolute right to the return of his child in the absence of a court order
84 Id at 665. In Brown, the child welfare agency placed a black infant, whose mother had aban-
doned her, with a white foster mother. Three years later, the agency removed the child from the
foster home and placed her elsewhere. The agency did not offer the foster mother any reasons for
the removal, nor did it disclose to her the home to which the child had been transferred. Id. at 655-
56.
85 423 So.2d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
86 In Berhow, the foster parents had cared for a female child named Dawn for most of her life.
The foster parents wished to adopt Dawn and her sister, Carolyn. The record was unclear as to what
transpired in the life of Carolyn between her birth and the time the foster parents petitioned the
court for her adoption. The court held that the foster parents had a fundamental liberty interest in
preserving their familial relationship with Dawn. In making this determination, the court empha-
sized the amount of time the child had spent in the foster home. The court found, however, that the
foster parents did not have a similar liberty interest in Carolyn. The court reasoned that the foster
parents' relationship with Carolyn was not substantial enough to recognize such an interest. Id. at
372-73.
87 See supra note 17.
88 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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obtainable only upon compliance with rigorous substantive and proce-
dural safeguards, which reflect the constitutional protection accorded
the natural family .... Moreover, the natural parent initially gave up
his child to the State only on the express understanding that the child
would be returned in those circumstances. These rights are difficult to
reconcile with the liberty interest in the foster family relationship
claimed by [the foster parents]. 89
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a liberty interest
in preserving the family when the family unit is either: (1) derived from
biological ties, 90 or (2) intended to be a permanent living arrangement. 9 1
The foster family cannot fit into either category. If the Court were to
acknowledge a liberty interest in the foster family, it would inevitably in-
fringe upon the substantive liberty it has already recognized in the natu-
ral family. Indeed, recognition of a foster family liberty interest would
mean that natural parents have no greater right to their children than do
foster parents.
Courts have clearly determined that in custody disputes between bi-
ological parents and third persons, parents should prevail unless the bio-
logical parents are unfit to care for their child.92 A contrary holding
would only discourage natural parents from utilizing foster care services,
because they would fear losing their children to foster parents. Because
the vast majority of foster care placements are voluntary, 93 courts must
be careful not to discourage parents from putting their children in the
foster care system in appropriate circumstances. Otherwise, due to this
fear of losing their children, a drop in placements may occur and the
ability of child welfare agencies to minister to children in need could be
severely curtailed.
B. Protecting Foster Parents' Interest in the Foster Family
Relationship: The Statutory Approach
Foster parents should be granted safeguards against arbitrary state
interference with their foster family relationships. However, attempting
to protect the integrity of the foster family by according a liberty interest
to the foster family unit would create an irreconcilable conflict with the
foster child's natural family.94 In addition, courts are ill-equipped to
structure the procedures necessary to protect foster parents from capri-
89 OFFER, 431 U.S. at 846.
90 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
91 For example, while the marriage relationship is not biologically created, the Court considers it
a permanent family construct. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). In addition, the Court views the adoptive family, another artificially created
unit, as a permanent living arrangement. See OFFER, 431 U.S. at 844 n.51.
92 See, e.g., Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1975); In re Denlow, 87 Misc. 2d 410, 384
N.Y.S.2d 621 (1976); In re Custody of Hernandez, 249 Pa. Super. Ct. 274, 376 A.2d 648 (1977); In re
N.H., 135 Vt. 230, 373 A.2d 851 (1977).
93 See supra note 3.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
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cious state-imposed removals of their foster children. Such a task is
properly within the domain of a state's legislature.95
In many ways, the New York State removal procedures should be the
paradigm for devising a system that will adequately safeguard foster par-
ents' interests when the state welfare agency wishes to remove their fos-
ter children from their home. These state procedures require the
following: (1) that foster families receive written notice of the removal;
(2) that the agency conduct a conference, if requested, between the fos-
ter parents and the agency, to which the foster parents may bring coun-
sel; (3) that the agency make a decision in writing within five days of the
conference; (4) that the agency stay the removal until such decision is
rendered; and (5) that the agency conduct a full adversary hearing for the
foster parents, subject to judicial review, if the agency recommends
removal. 96
Clearly, the New York State removal system affords foster parents a
number of needed statutory protections. Foster parents under this sys-
tem are given a sufficient amount of time to present their case for retain-
ing the child. Also, the process assures the parents that a disinterested
and unbiased court can review any removal decision they believe is
unjustified.
While New York's procedures are laudable, they are also deficient in
several respects. In view of the important role that foster parents play in
their foster children's lives, 97 more protections are needed for foster
parents.
First, under the New York State system, the letter sent to the foster
parents apprising them of the agency's decision to remove their foster
child does not state the reasons for the removal. The New York State
removal statute is silent as to why the agency need not explain the rea-
sons for its decision in its letter to the foster family. The foster care
agency informs the foster parents of the basis for its decision only at the
initial conference. 98 While the agency allows the foster parents to have
counsel present at this conference, they are usually unable to prepare an
adequate defense because of the delay in receiving the reasons for re-
moval. Accordingly, state legislatures should require foster care agen-
cies to inform foster parents of the reasons for removal in their initial
notice. In this manner, foster parents can be better prepared to defend
their position at the conference.
Second, though New York State law affords foster parents a full ad-
versary review, this hearing is only available after removal. 99 In contrast,
New York City procedures provide an opportunity for a full adversary
hearing before the foster care agency takes the child from her foster par-
95 See Organization of Foster Families v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 290-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(Pollack, J., dissenting).
96 For an elaboration of these procedures, see supra note 77.
97 Because they often spend several years caring for their foster children, foster parents function
as vital surrogate parents. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
98 See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 400 (McKinney 1983); N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 18,
§ 431.10 (a) (1983).
99 Id.
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ents. 00 Thus, New York City procedures award foster parents a protec-
tive measure that the state provisions do not. All foster parents should
be entitled to this additional safeguard.
A mandatory adversary meeting prior to the child's removal from
her foster parents advances foster family integrity in two ways. First, it
helps to ensure that the state's welfare agency is not treating the foster
child like a "ping-pong ball" by arbitrarily shifting her from one foster
home to another. At present, this is one of the major problems with the
foster care system. 10 1 Second, it allows the foster parents to keep their
foster child in their home until a full adversary review has been com-
pleted. Such a scheme would substantially mitigate the chances of foster
parents losing their foster children as a result of an erroneous adminis-
trative decision.
Most importantly, to be truly protective of foster parents' interests in
their foster children, any legislative scheme should enable foster parents
to assume full parental rights and duties if the natural parents become
unable to care for the child. Such provisions are desperately needed be-
cause approximately one fourth of the children currently in foster care
are not likely to be reunited with their biological parents. 10 2 Should re-
turn of the child to her natural parents become infeasible, 0 3 the foster
parents should be afforded the opportunity to give their foster child a
permanent home.
State child welfare agencies should employ the same criteria for se-
lecting prospective foster parents as they utilize for finding prospective
adoptive parents. Currently, only one state, Arizona, has embraced this
approach.10 4 Several other states merely prefer foster parents if the child
becomes freed for adoption. California, 10 5 Illinois,'0 6 Missouri, 10 7 New
Jersey, 08 New York,' 0 9 and South Dakota ' 0 have adopted this position.
This approach does not adequately protect foster parents' interests in
adoption proceedings because the criteria that child welfare agencies
utilize for choosing adoptive homes are ordinarily more demanding than
the standards that the agencies employ for selecting foster homes. 11'
For example, in making a determination as to whether a couple will be
suitable adoptive parents, a child welfare agency will place considerable
emphasis on the couple's age, race, ethnicity, and physical characteris-
100 See Special Services for Children, Procedure No. 5 (August 5, 1974).
101 Indeed, because multiple placement is the rule, little stability exists in the foster care system.
See Dobbs, supra note 2, at 6.
102 See M.JoNES, supra note 60, at 5-6.
103 Typically, the grounds for termination of parental rights are abandonment, mental illness or
retardation, abuse, and permanent neglect. See Dobbs, supra note 2, at 18.
104 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-515.03(5) (West Supp. 1985). Until recently, South Carolina had a
similar statute. S.C. CODE § 20-7-1630(3) (repealed 1985).
105 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.25(k) (West Supp. 1986).
106 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1519.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
107 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.070(5) (Vernon 1986).
108 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-26.7 (West 1981).
109 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(3) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
110 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-6-21.1 (1984).
111 See Goldstein, supra note 34, at 648-49.
[Vol. 62:22 1
tics.112 Such factors are not used to select foster parents. Thus, after
providing shelter, care and affection to children who have remained in
their home for lengthy periods of time,' 13 foster parents could lose their
foster children to prospective adoptive parents who have no emotional
or psychological ties to the youngsters.
Requiring child care agencies to choose foster parents who might
later serve as adoptive parents protects the concerns of all interested par-
ties in the foster care system. Such a requirement would protect the in-
terests of the foster child in having guardians who can effectively
minister to her emotional and psychological needs." 4 It would also pro-
vide natural parents with the knowledge that their child has been en-
trusted to surrogate parents who are completely able, if necessary, to
assume full parental responsibilities. Finally, such a plan could provide
foster parents with the expectation that if the child's reunion with her
natural parents becomes impracticable, the integrity of the foster family
relationship will be preserved.
III. Conclusion
Tort liability and arbitrary state disruptions of foster family relation-
ships are the two most pressing concerns which foster parents face at
present. Currently, very few states have enacted legislation which can
address these issues in a meaningful way. Most states which have con-
fronted these issues have attempted to resolve them in the judicial arena.
The judiciary, however, is unsuited to fashion adequate safeguards for
foster parents. Since foster home programs are the geneses of state stat-
utes, the task of formulating protections for foster families is properly in
the legislative forum. Hopefully, all states will recognize the importance
of enacting legislative measures that will protect the interests of foster
care's most vital resource: Its foster parents.
Vincent S. Nadile
112 See In re Davis, 502 Pa. 110, 465 A.2d 614 (1983).
113 See supra note 14.
114 See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973) (children need to develop close emotional bonds with parental figures for healthy psychologi-
cal development).
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